The Effect of Color Revolutions on Economic Reforms: Comparing Georgia and Kyrgyzstan With their Neighbors
Part One: The Caucasus Countries

Introduction

Can a color revolution bring a country from rags to riches? Do color revolutions accelerate economic reforms? How do reforms after revolutions affect corruption and key macroeconomic parameters?

This article analyzes the economic impact of color revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. These countries represent two geographically close regions that are often analyzed together: Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The article compares the economic outlook in these countries to their reform-committed neighbors that did not experience color revolutions: Georgia to Armenia and Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan to Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are excluded, having pursued isolationism and very limited economic reforms when color revolutions occurred. The article explores four cases: 1) Color revolution (Georgia and Kyrgyzstan); 2) Changes of power without color revolutions (Armenia); 3) Stable authoritarian regime since independence or shortly after the country gained independence (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan); 4) Authoritarian regime that emerged after a long period of instabillity (Tajikistan). (Cases 2 and 4 can be taken as a more general case of a country having had more than one distinct regime, without having to undergo color revolution.)


My hypothesis

As a rule, the pro-western opposition initiates color revolutions. Once in power, they conduct economic reforms quicker or more radically than the old government had, easing business activity. These reforms may temporarily increase unemployment, slow down GDP growth, and increase inflation as the country restructures its economy. Once the restructuring is complete, growth resumes and inflation slows down. During global growth periods, real GDP and employment grow and inflation declines faster than in their neighbors. During recessions, such as the Great Recession of the late 2000s, real GDP of countries that progressed further in reforms may plummet more, since their economies are more exposed to fluctuations of financial markets of developed countries. Unpopular pro-western policies of the previous government may induce the pro-Russian opposition to come to power through color revolutions, like they did in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. In this case, the economy may or may not become more open from stronger association with Russia, depending on how it affects ties with other countries, but changes in other economic areas may be less far reaching. For example, under the Atambayev administration, Kyrgyzstan joined the Eurasian Economic Union and the Parliament became more powerful, but the country had not conducted privatization or deregulation to an extent comparable with Georgia. Adverse economic conditions in Russia may hurt the country’s economy under this scenario, but the country benefits from free labor movement during better periods.

Reforms in Georgia

From 1992 till 2003, President Eduard Shevarnadze, once Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, ruled Georgia. Under his regime, Transparency International listed Georgia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, reports Natalia Antelava, of The New Yorker.

Nevertheless, Shevarnadze did conduct some pro-western reforms, stirring hopes for new changes. For example, in 2000, Georgia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) after less than four years of negotiations, reports the WTO. In 2002, Georgia officially requested invitation to join the European Union. According to him, “Since Georgia’s independence we never thought on any option other than to be a European Union member,” reports Civil Georgia, a news website about Georgia.

After the 2003 Rose Revolution, President Mikhail Saakashvili initiated new free market reforms. The government privatized 13,000 enterprises, abolished the minimum capital requirement, and decreased the corporate tax from 47% to 15%. The number of licenses for businesses was decreased from 944 to 150. The number of taxes was decreased from 22 to seven. Tax collection improved, increasing tax revenue more than tenfold, reports Gia Jiandieri of the Brenthurst Foundation, a think tank drawing from experiences of various countries to generate ideas for better performance of African countries.

Today, starting a business requires only two procedures and two days. The average applied tariff rate is only 0.7%, one of the lowest in the world, reports the Heritage Foundation. Customers benefit from lower tariffs through cheaper goods, though import-competing producers lose. Most economists support free trade, since its benefit to customers (consumer surplus) exceeds the loss to producers (producer surplus) and the foregone government revenue, and the economy becomes more competitive in the long run. The simpler the regulations, the easier it is for businesses to operate. As more businesses enter the market, other factors being constant, labor demand rises, increasing wages and employment.

However, Table 5 shows that unemployment in Georgia increased after 2004. Like other former Soviet republics, Georgia has been suffering from structural unemployment, a mismatch between the skills that employers currently demand and the skills that prospective employees possess. State sector layoffs may have contributed to structural unemployment. Tables 3 and 4 show that Georgia grew slower in the 2000s than other countries in the region but also had a less inflationary economy. The National Bank of Georgia may have increased the money supply less than the central banks of its neighbors, since the country has been aspiring to join the EU. According to the Maastricht Treaty that established the EU, inflation of any member state must not exceed by more than 1.5 point that of the three best performing member states in terms of price stability, reports The National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, an institute processing statistical information on France. Supporters of laissez-faire policies that Saakashvili practiced usually view inflation as a bigger problem than unemployment, since they believe that prices and wages adjust with aggregate demand in a free market, restoring full employment in the long run. Increasing employment by raising the money supply (at the cost of higher inflation) may cause consumers and producers to wrongfully interpret money supply increases as increases in actual demand for a particular product.

Free markets also tend to over-generate negative externalities and under-generate positive externalities. These are costs or benefits to third parties (accordingly) that free markets do not account for. To achieve efficiency, the government must intervene by setting taxes (or selling permits) or subsidies, correspondingly, to equate the social benefit of each additional unit with its social cost. Governments may also set limiting standards on negative externalities, such as pollution, and enforce them through inspections. These standards do not achieve efficiency and are often more difficult to implement, but they can be tougher on polluters than taxes or permits and do not treat the environment as a marketable commodity.

Pollution is severe in Georgia. In 2004, Saakashvili ended vehicles emissions inspections, arguing that they only breeded corruption. City pollution increased with increased car usage, though cars also enabled employing many people as drivers. The standard for diesel sulfur has been lax at 22 parts per million, compared with 10 parts per million in Europe, reports Prathap Nair of Citylab, a website, exploring issues and ideas on city development through storytelling, original reporting and sharp analysis.

The World Health Organization reported in 2016 based on 2012 data that Georgia had the highest mortality rate in the world from household and ambient air pollution, with 292.3 deaths per 100,000 people. In comparison, China, known for nototoriously high pollution rates, had 163.1 deaths per 100,000 people. Armenia had 125.4 deaths and Azerbaijan had 68 deaths per 100,000 people. However, because the population of Georgia is only 3.731 million as of 2018, compared with 1.393 billion for China, according to World Bank data, the total number of deaths due to pollution in Georgia is much smaller. Also, these figures do not account for the full cost of pollution: there are social costs to treatment and people dropping from the workforce due to diseases.

Education is an example of a good with positive externalities. Some positive externalities of education include increasing participation in the political process, building a sense of community and reducing crime. Free public education supporters argue that it increases such benefits. Yet these benefits are difficult to quantify. Opponents also argue that state-owned schools often indoctrinate students, rather than provide objective knowledge and that the state pays for students of rich, as well as poor, parents. Education is not a pure public good, since students can be effectively excluded and the cost of teaching each additional student is above zero, though it may be small in an uncongested classroom. Economists have proposed several compromise approaches, such as school vouchers.

President Saakashvili introduced a school voucher system that exists in Georgia now Each elementary and high school is a separate legal entity, managed by its Board of Trustees, formed from selected schoolteachers, parents and students. The Ministry of Education appoints candidates for school directors to be elected by the Board, reports Gruzinskij.ru, a website about travelling and studying in Georgia. The government no longer finances the schools themselves. Instead, it grants each schoolchild a voucher, a fixed amount of money that the student can spend on any school. Each school can accept donations or lease rooms and buildings to receive more funds, report Lela Chorgolashvili and Oxana Davitadze, of Pedsovet.su, a website devoted to mutual assistance of educators in the former Soviet Republics. No other former Soviet republic has such a system.

Studies of school voucher systems in some states in the United States show that they increase competition between schools and reduce education costs. Yet school vouchers can also leave public schools under-financed and increase income segregation. School autonomy in Georgia gives more power to teachers, parents and students, but the need to lease out faciities may leave too few resources available for studying, decreasing education quality.

Results of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests for 2018 of 15 year old students in 78 countries suggest that students in Georgia perform relatively poorly. Georgian 15-year-olds scored 380 points, compared with 487 points on average in OECD countries in reading literacy, 389 points, compared with 489 points on average in OECD countries in mathematics and 383 points, compared with 489 points on average in OECD countries in science. Nevertheless, the average difference between advantaged and disadvantaged students in reading was 68 points, compared to the OECD average of 89 points, and 12% of students were characterized as academically resilient (able to achieve satisfactory scores, in spite of coming from poor families), compared to the OECD average of 11%, reports the OECD. Education quality in Georgia remains relatively low, but the gap between student performance from rich and poor families in Georgia is no worse than average for the OECD. Students in Armenia and Azerbaijan did not take PISA tests.

Though the Saakashvili government improved the business climate and reduced corruption in Georgia, some people viewed its social policy as inadequate and some regretted the worsening of relations with Russia. After the new Georgian Dream coalition won the parliamentary election in 2012 and the presidential election in 2013, it increased state pensions 50%, provided basic healthcare insurance for all citizens (under the previous government, only about half were covered), and granted more protection for laborers. Tbilisi continued to pursue close ties with the EU, but made several friendly gestures towards Moscow, including the decision not to boycott the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, reports Marek Matusiak of the Centre for Eastern Studies, a Polish state analytic center researching political, economic and social issues in Central and Western Europe, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. To finance additional social spending, Tbilisi had to increase the overall tax burden (the ratio of budget tax income to GDP) from 24.8% in 2013 to 26.7% in 2017, reports Grass FactCheck, a media project in Georgia, measuring the factual accuracy of statements that public figures make. Unemployment decreased to 14% by 2016, according to the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. However, real GDP growth slowed down to less than 3% in 2014-2015, compared with 6.35% in 2012.

The new regime also took environmental protection measures. In June 2014, Georgia signed an Association Agreement with the EU, mandating such measures, reports Agenda.ge, a news platform ran by the Administration of the Government of Georgia. The National Agency of Environment installed 60 monitoring devices around the country, including 26 in the capital city, also reports Agenda.ge. After inspections began in January 2018, about 25% of vehicles inspected between January and early April failed, also reports Prathap Nair of Citylab. According to a 2019 report, based on 2016 data, deaths from air pollution had already fallen by then to 101.8 per 100,000 people. For Armenia, the figure was 54.8 and for Azerbaijan, 63.9 per 100,000 people, reports the World Health Organization. Thus, Georgia remains the most hazardous country in the Caucasus region in terms of pollution, but deaths decreased considerably since the previously mentioned report based on 2012 data.

Reforms in Armenia

Unlike Georgia, Armenia never underwent a color revolution. However, the power of the President there has always been comparatively weak. Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the first President of Armenia, resigned on February 3, 1998. Painful transition and unrestrained corruption caused his downfall. Armenia experienced the horror of hyperinflation of 10,896.2% in 1993 and 1,884.55% in 1994, the highest among the former Soviet republics, and double-digit inflation (31.93% and 21.88%) in 1995 and 1997, according to the IMF World Economic Outlook Database. David Petrosyan, a columnist for the Noyan Topan news agency, wrote that the defense minister, the interior minister, and one of the President’s brothers had then become “the main leaders of oligarchic structures in Armenia,” reports Stephan Astourian, of the University of California.

Robert Kocharian, the second President, served for two terms and left office voluntarily. The 1999 shooting of the Armenian parliament and cracking down on the 2008 presidential election protests happened during his regime. Yet these were also the years of the construction boom and double-digit economic growth, reports Gayane Abrahamyan, of Armenia Now, an online news publication.

The next President, Serzh Sargsyan, served for two terms until April 2018. A December 2015 referendum established Armenia as a parliamentary republic. Many opposition leaders criticized the constitutional amendment, since it would allow Sargsyan to retain power if his political party were to win the next election. About 20 protesters against the referendum were detained after it took place, reports Vestnik Kavkaza. After Armen Sarkissian was elected President and Serzh Sargsyan became Prime Minister in April 2018, two weeks of protests and demonstrations led Sargsyan to resign, reports The Armenian Weekly newspaper. After his resignation, the opposition leader Nikkolo Pashinyan became Prime Minister.

Some analysts have compared Sargsyan’s resignation to color revolutions. However, no change in foreign policy or cardinally new reforms happened afterwards, unlike in Georgia or Kyrgyzstan. Sargsyan’s resignation was in line with an already existing trend towards strengthening the opposition and the legislative branch.

Armenia has been implementing economic reforms slower than Georgia. The country joined the World Trade Organization in 2003 and simplified customs and tax administration, reports the International Trade Centre, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the United Nations. Armenia has also eliminated the minimum capital requirement for business start-ups. Nevertheless, Table 2 shows that corruption in Armenia remains high by world standards.

Unlike Georgia, Armenia still provides free public school education. The Law of the Republic of Armenia of 1999 “On Education” mandates free public school education and provides textbooks to all first grade students and elementary school students from poor families.

Armenia experienced double-digit real GDP growth in the mid-2000s. Yet remittances, primarily from Russia, played a significant role in the economic growth in the country. In 2006, they accounted for 18.3% of real GDP of Armenia, compared to 8.1% in Georgia, reports the World Bank.

The economy of Georgia fared better than that of Armenia in many ways during the second half of the 2000s. As Table 3 shows, during the Great Recession of the late 2000s, the real GDP growth of Armenia plummeted harder than that of Georgia, even though Georgia had fought a war against Russia over the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008. The recovery of 2010-2011 in Georgia was more impressive. Nevertheless, Table 3 shows that Georgia experienced higher inflation in 2010 than Armenia did.

Georgia’s economy may have grown quicker during the late 2000s than Armenia’s, for several reasons. First, dependence on Russia harmed the Armenian economy more, since Russian real GDP fell 7.82% in 2009. Second, Georgia may have inflated its currency to restore real GDP growth. During the first ten days of June 2010, the lari exchange rate to the dollar depreciated from 1.78 to 1.88, reports Nugzar Esebua of Newcaucasus.com, an independent media website, devoted to describing events in the Caucasus countries. The depreciation benefited exporters but pulled up inflation. Since more lari were needed to buy dollars, imported goods became more expensive. In contrast, the Armenian dram appreciated during most of 2010, after peaking at 404.36 dram per USD on March 19, according to the Central Bank of Armenia. A currency appreciation hurts exporters but lowers inflation, since it becomes cheaper to import goods into the country.

In 2015, Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Armenia now benefits from free labor movement. Armenia also benefits from trade creation with other member states but loses from trade diversion with non-members. In 2017, Yerevan signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU, implying lower tariffs and other trade barriers. Specifically, Armenia benefits from the General Scheme of Preferences for vulnerable low- and lower-middle income countries (GSP+), which slashes tariffs on goods that these countries export to the EU to 0%, if these countries implement 27 international conventions on human rights, labor rights, environmental protection and good governance, reports the European Commission. Nevertheless, Russia continues to be the country’s key trading partner.

Reforms in Azerbaijan

Since shortly after the country became independent, authoritarian leaders ruled Azerbaijan: Heydar Aliyev ruled from 1993 till his death in 2003, and his son Ilham Aliyev ruled the country after 2003. Heydar stabilized Azerbaijan upon signing a ceasefire agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and the disputed Nagorny Karabakh region in 1994. However, arrests for political reasons became common. Repressive practices continued under Ilham. Hundreds of non-governmental organizations in Azerbaijan have been denied registration for no clear reason, reports Amnesty International.

Market reforms did occur under the Aliyev Presidents, attracting investments. By 2003, the private sector accounted for 73.2% of all investments, reports Ilaha Mamedli, of the Trend news agency. Nevertheless, subsidies for drugs, energy, food and electricity continue to distort prices and production, reports Heritage Foundation. Table 1 shows that Azerbaijan has the largest share of government spending as a percent of GDP among the Caucasus countries.

Unlike Tbilisi, Baku continues to support elementary and high schools directly. Article 42 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic states that the government mandates free general secondary (elementary, middle and high school) education and controls it.

As Table 2 shows, this largest economy in the Caucasus region suffers from corruption more than its neighbors do. As of 2018, Azerbaijan has ranked the same as for Cameroon and Madagascar on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. Azerbaijan has yet to join the WTO, reports Heritage Foundation.

Tables 3-5 show that the economy of Azerbaijan grew faster than its neighbors in the mid-2000s amid the oil boom, yet experienced higher inflation then. Azerbaijan performed worse during the Great Recession and recovered slower. However, unemployment in oil-rich Azerbaijan has been lower than in its neighbors.

Country	Index of Economic Freedom, ranking (2019)	Ease of Doing Business Index, ranking (2019)	Government spending as a share of GDP, % (over the past 3 years)
Georgia	16	6	29.6
Armenia	47	41	26.4
Azerbaijan	60	25	36.7

Sources: Heritage Foundation and The World Bank

Table 1: Most recent available rankings of key economic indices and fiscal parameters 
for countries of the Caucasus

Country	Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking (2003)	Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking (2018)
Georgia	124	41
Armenia	78	105
Azerbaijan	124	152

Source: Transparency International

Table 2: Changes in corruption rankings for countries of the Caucasus

(2018 versus 2003)

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Armenia	14.807	14.052	10.473	14.113	13.198	13.749	6.948	-14.15	2.200	4.700	7.134
Azerbaijan	9.439	10.208	9.254	27.962	34.466	25.463	10.591	9.370	4.789	-1.573	2.203
Georgia	5.474	11.058	5.794	9.590	9.420	12.579	2.419	-3.651	6.249	7.222	6.351

Source: The IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019

Table 3: Real GDP growth rate of countries of the Caucasus, % (2002-2012)

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Armenia	2.846	7.440	1.719	0.424	5.356	6.684	5.307	6.717	8.482	4.652	3.227
Azerbaijan	3.155	3.529	10.455	5.350	11.328	19.561	15.481	0.699	7.950	5.611	-0.277
Georgia	5.847	6.886	7.483	6.179	8.778	10.975	5.548	2.986	11.241	2.041	-1.373

Source: The IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019

Table 4: End of period inflation rates of countries of the Caucasus, % (2002-2012)

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Armenia	35.300	31.200	31.600	31.200	27.800	28.700	16.400	18.700	19.000	18.400	17.300
Azerbaijan	10.037	9.167	7.987	7.256	6.615	6.326	5.856	5.742	5.631	5.424	5.185
Georgia	13.500	12.700	13.900	15.100	15.400	17.400	17.900	18.300	17.400	17.300	17.200

Source: The IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019

Table 5: Unemployment as a percent of labor force of countries of the Caucasus, % (2002-2012)

Relationship between political and economic reforms in the Caucasus region

The comparison between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan illustrates a positive relationship between political and economic reform and shows that the Rose Revolution accelerated reforms there. Oil-rich authoritarian Azerbaijan could get away with retaining a relatively closed economy with a comparatively large public sector. The less powerful Armenian authorities have had an incentive to conduct further-reaching reforms than in Azerbaijan, but more pro-western Georgia has gone the farthest in conducting them. The price of free market policies for Georgia, however, was higher unemployment, increased pollution and worsened relations with Russia, which Presidents and governnmennt after Saakashvili needed to overcome.


Comparing with Kyrgyzstan and Its Neighbors

Success of reforms in Georgia dwarfs that of Kyrgyzstan. Part 2 of this article describes economic reforms in Kyrgyzstan and two of its neighbors - Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.


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