A review of The Anatomy of Revolution by Crane Brinton: Analyzing color revolutions using Brinton's criteria

(See the previous post to read the first part of the review)

Introduction

Are color revolutions true revolutions?  What characteristics do color revolutions share?

This post describes the similarities and differences between color revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia and the four revolutions that Crane Brinton analyzed. Though Kyrgyzstan technically had two revolutions, I analyze them together, since events after the second one parallel those in Georgia after Saakashvili in some ways. (Information about war-torn Ukraine is more contradictory than about revolutions in the other two countries. The revolutionary process there is likely to be incomplete, so it is mentioned only briefly.)


Distinguishing characteristics of color revolutions

Unlike the four revolutions in Brinton’s book, color revolutions in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia were less oppressive. The color revolutions involved less oppression against the old regime and its supporters. Though Akayev, Bakiyev and Saakashvili faced criminal charges, all three fled abroad. Eduard Shevarnadze, the Georgian President before the Rose Revolution, only had to step down from office. There were no confiscations or personal freedom restrictions.

The revolutions that Crane Brinton studied were social and class-based, and so were color revolutions. The emerging middle class hoped that new governments would respond to their needs better than the old Soviet-style governments that stayed in power through rigged elections. Migrants who worked abroad wanted more freedom of travel. Color revolutions did not change the economic systems of their countries: their governments had already allowed free enterprise. Yet both countries progressed from further economic and political liberalization.

Brinton stressed in his book that with the exception of the American Revolution that he had used as a control, the revolutions he analyzed were not nationalistic or territorial. Due to contradictory information, however, we cannot use the revolutions in Ukraine as a full-scale control. Pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian sources disagree on the extent of nationalism in Ukraine, but it played a far bigger role in the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Euromaidan of 2013-2014 than in color revolutions in the other two countries. The governments of ex-President Yuschenko and current President Poroshenko in Ukraine were noted for being more oppressive than those in the other two countries, though sources also vary on their claims about the extent of the oppression. There has been a split between western Ukraine, whose people tended to embrace the new pro-western governments, and eastern Ukraine, whose people tended to support the pro-Russian ex-President Yanukovich. Later, Ukraine would lose the peninsula of Crimea to Russia and two pro-Russian separatist republics would emerge in the Donbass region. Hence, the Ukrainian revolutionary process is atypical for color revolutions.

The leaders and their policies

Backgrounds of the new Presidents differed. In Georgia, western-educated and western-trained Saakashvili replaced Shevarnadze, Soviet ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet both Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Askar Akayev used to hold positions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In 1989-1991, Akayev was a People’s Deputy of the USSR and a member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet (the USSR’s legislature) on Economic Reform issues, reports RIA Novosti. In 1990-1991, Bakiyev was the First Secretary of the Kok-Yangak City Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the City Council of Kok-Yagnak, also reports RIA Novosti. Mikheil Saakashvili was 37 years old when he became President, fitting in the age category that Crane Brinton described, unlike the 54-year-old Bakiyev at the time of his first year of presidency.

The policies of the new Presidents also differed. Saakashvili reduced government expenditures and curbed corruption. In July 2004, Georgia reformed the police. Around 30,000 police officers were fired to create a corruption-free force. In 2015, Georgia ranked 48th place on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, compared with 124th place in 2003, reports the Centre for Public Impact. Other reforms included establishing private health insurance and introducing school vouchers. On the other hand, Bakiyev did little to fight corruption. Kyrgyzstan fell from 130th place in 2005 to 164th place in 2010 on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.

New governments enhanced ties with the West and worsened relations with Russia. Conflicts occurred in both countries. Georgia fought a war against Russia and the separatist regions of Abkhasia and South Ossetia in 2008 and faced prohibition of Georgian mineral water and wine imports into Russia. Bakiyev did not directly confront Russia, yet fell between two stools. A U.S. military base for fighting terrorism in Afghanistan had operated on the territory of Bishkek Airport since 2001, though the Bakiyev Administration proclaimed its intention to close it. In 2009, however, the base was reorganized into a Transit Center, reports BBC News. In response, Russia slapped new duties on fuel exports into Kyrgyzstan, report David Trilling and Chinghiz Umetov, of EurasiaNet.org. The Bakiyev Administration also increased ties with China. A deal on building the Datka-Kemin transmission lines was signed between Kyrgyzstan’s national power company and the Chinese Tebian Electric, to make Kyrgyzstan independent from the Central Asian transmission system, reports Erica Marat, of Eurasia Daily Monitor. After Bakiyev was overthrown, Kyrgyzstan experienced ethnic tensions. As many as 2,000 people may have died in the clashes in June 2010 between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz that followed the second revolution, reports BBC News. 

Power struggles and protests

There were no struggles between “moderates” and “extremists” or dual sovereignty in either country, yet both leaders faced resistance after color revolutions. After the Rose Revolution, Aslan Abashidze, leader of the autonomous republic of Adjaria, refused to recognize Saakashvili’s regime. Yet the military in Adjaria sided with the central government. On May 6, 2004, Abashidze resigned and fled to Russia where he currently resides, reports Democracy and Freedom Watch. Felix Kulov, Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan from August 15, 2005 till January 29, 2007, had initially intended to run for President, but joined Bakiyev’s team. Yet several scandals, particularly the killing of deputy Tynychbek Akmatbayev, triggered Kulov’s resignation, reports Sputnik. After resigning, Kulov joined the opposition and petitioned for a referendum to form a confederation with Russia, reports Ferghana News.

Both presidents cracked down on rebels against their regimes. In November 2007, thousands of protesters demanded Saakashvili’s resignation. Over 350 people were injured on the first demonstration day alone, reports C.J. Chivers, of The New York Times. In May 2011, about 5,000 people gathered for protest again. Two people were killed and 37 received minor injuries, reports the Deutsche Welle. In 2009, after Bakiyev was re-elected by 76% of the vote, the police detained dozens who claimed that he had won the election illegally, reports the Voice of America.

Convalescence periods

Convalescence periods occurred after these leaders were removed from power. Saakashvili was not permitted to run for a third term; Kyrgyzstan experienced a second color revolution. Both leaders are wanted in their countries for power abuses.

The Georgian Dream, the new ruling party of Georgia, initiated talks to delink economic and social issues from territorial disputes to make Russia re-open trade with Georgia, reports Vesti.ru. This party included many “red directors”, or people who have been holding managerial positions in enterprises since the Soviet period. Many of them had connections with the passsed-away ex-President Shevarnadze, a supporter of the Georgian Dream, reports the Krym.Realii information agency. However, Georgia still pursues accession to the European Union and NATO. In May 2017, Georgia also signed a free trade agreement with China, reports News-Georgia. In April 2018, the Georgian President signed constitutional amendments, making Georgia a parliamentary republic, reports Naviny.by, a Belarus-based news agency.

After 2010, Kyrgyzstan increased its ties with Russia. The country joined the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. Some analysts argued that Kyrgyzstan became more authoritarian. Former President Atambayev had signed a constitutional amendment that increased the power of the prime minister and parliament, reducing political risks of another President coming to power. However, Kyrgyzstan is no longer obliged to abide by any international ruling on human rights violations within its borders. In 2017, Freedom House published the report The Nations in Transit 2017, re-classifying Kyrgyzstan as a Consolidated Authoritarian Regime, a category it had left in 2011. Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz Parliament is the most powerful legislature among all Central Asian countries, implying better division of power.

Color revolutions affected both countries. Each paid with ethnic conflicts and sanctions from Russia. Georgia gained from a reduction in corruption, underwent market reforms, and expects gains from increased trade with the EU countries. Kyrgyzstan remains poor and authoritarian, but decreasing the power of the President reduced political risks of another one coming to power. 

Conclusion

The collapse of the USSR and the color revolutions that occurred in some former Soviet republics show that revolutionary trends that Crane Brinton illustrated in his book are still relevant in many ways. I highly recommend reading The Anatomy of Revolution by Crane Brinton.

References

BBC News. Bakiev sworn in as Kyrgyz leader. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4150084.stm. 2005.

BBC News. Kyrgyz referendum backs constitutional change plan. http://www.bbc.com/news/10426533. 2010.

BBC News. Q&A: Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic violence. https://www.bbc.com/news/10313948. 2010.

BBC News Russian Service. Kyrgyzstan: 10 years of American military presence. https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2011/12/111223_kyrgyzstan_us_base_anno. 2011.

Centre for Public Impact. Seizing the moment: Rebuilding Georgia’s police. https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/siezing-moment-rebuilding-georgias-police/. 2016.

Chivers, C. Georgia cracks down on protesters. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/world/europe/07iht-georgia.4.8235996.html. 2007.

Democracy and Freedom Watch. Aslan Abashidze, Adjara’s former ruler, sentenced in absentia to 15 years’ jail. http://dfwatch.net/aslan-abashidze-adjaras-former-ruler-sentenced-in-absentia-to-15-years-44500. 2016.

Deutsche Welle. Georgian police cracks down on protesters on Independence Day. http://www.dw.com/en/georgian-police-crack-down-on-protesters-on-independence-day/a-15107937. 2011.

Ferghana News. Felix Kulov suggests a confederation with Russia. http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=1991&print=1. 2007.

Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2017. Kyrgyzstan. https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/kyrgyzstan. 2017.

KrymRealii. How the "Georgian Dream" became a bluff.

Marat, E. Kyrgyzstan boosts cooperation with China. https://jamestown.org/program/kyrgyzstan-boosts-cooperation-with-china/. 2010.

Naviny.by. Georgia has become a parliamentary repubic. https://naviny.by/new/20180402/1522691711-gruziya-stala-parlamentskoy-respublikoy. 2018.

News-Georgia. Georgia and China signed a free trade agreement. https://www.newsgeorgia.ge/gruziya-i-kitaj-podpisali-soglashenie-o-svobodnoj-torgovle/. 2017.

RIA Novosti. Askar Akayev: The President’s fate. https://ria.ru/spravka/20061107/55430275.html. 2006.

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Trilling, D. Umetov, C. Kyrgyzstan: Is Putin punishing Bakiyev? EurasiaNet.org. https://eurasianet.org/s/kyrgyzstan-is-putin-punishing-bakiyev. 2010.

Voice of America. Kyrgyz authorities crack down on opposition rallies. https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2009-07-29-voa26-68652882/354422.html. 2009.